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ABSTRACT 
An Empirical Study of the Impact of Changes in Ownership  




Master of Philosophy 
This study uses agency theory to test whether the demand for quality audits by listed 
Chinese companies is associated with changes in ownership structure, which is 
characterized by the dominance of the state, institutional and individual shareholders. 
The empirical test results obtained in a concentrated ownership setting are supportive of 
agency theory. Specifically, I find that the decrease of state shares and the corresponding 
increase of institutional shares result in a demand for higher-quality audits in China’s 
stock market. The results provide empirical support for the government’s recent 
initiative in reducing state ownership in listed companies to improve firm performance 
and the supply of quality accounting information through independent auditing. 
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An Empirical Study of the Impact of Changes in Ownership 
Structure on Audit Quality in an Emerging Stock Market 
 
1 Introduction 
The recent audit failures and accounting scandals in the capital markets of 
China (e.g., ???) and the U.S. (e.g., Enron) have resulted in increasing concern 
over corporate governance and audit quality. This paper applies agency theory to 
explain whether a firm’s demand for quality-differentiated audits in China is affected 
by its ownership structure, which is predominated by three major types of 
shareholders, namely the state, institutions and individual investors. Specifically, I 
hypothesize that the decrease of state shares, and the corresponding increase of 
institutional and tradable A-shares would lead to the demand for higher-quality audits 
in China’s stock markets. 
Agency theory suggests that a firm’s ownership structure affects its demand 
for independent auditing (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986). When share ownership is dispersed and the majority of 
shareholders are composed of individual investors, there is an increased preference 
for credible financial information and thus for higher quality audits (DeFond, 1992; 
Francis and Wilson, 1988; Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). When shares are 
concentrated and controlled by market-oriented economic entities and institutions, as 
opposed to government agencies, institutional investors have strong incentives to 
actively monitor firm management through independent auditing to promote the best 
interest of different institutions they represent (Bushee, 1998; Pound, 1988; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1986).  
In China’s stock markets, the government owns the majority of listed 
companies’ shares. This dominance of share ownership by the government creates 
severe agency problems, which lead to poor firm performance (Qi et al., 2000; Xu 
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and Wang, 1999; Wang, 2003). The Chinese government has in recent years 
undertaken share ownership reform to reduce its holdings by selling off state shares 
to improve firm performance. This reform has brought changes in the ownership 
structures of Chinese listed companies. 
This research investigates whether these changes in ownership structure 
affect the demand for quality-differentiated audits by listed companies in China. In 
this study, audit quality is proxied by auditor size, which is measured based on total 
clientele assets of an audit firm, and quality differentiated audits are captured by 
comparing the size of the new auditor with that of the old auditor in the year of 
auditor change. Thus, an auditor change from a smaller auditor to a larger auditor 
indicates a demand for a higher-quality auditor. 
I test the hypothesis by analyzing 208 voluntary auditor switches over the 
1997-2002 period. Consistent with the hypothesis, I find that the demand for quality 
audits increases in proportion to the increase in institutional shares and decreases in 
proportion to the increase in state shares. However, I find that diffused ownership by 
domestic investors is not associated with demand for higher audit quality. These 
results support the active monitoring role of institutional investors (Bushee, 1998; 
Pound, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) and have important implications for policy 
makers. The results are robust after controlling for client size, leverage, industry, 
accruals, management change, return on equity and time effect, and for other 
alternative definitions of audit quality.  
This paper contributes to literature on the role of auditing in the context of 
concentrated versus diffused ownership structures. Prior studies have typically 
examined the impact of ownership structure on audit quality in large mature markets 
(e.g., Chow, 1982; DeFond, 1992; Gul et al., 1999). These studies all use 
management ownership to proxy a firm’s ownership structure in a diffused 
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ownership setting. However, the use of management ownership as a proxy for a 
firm’s ownership structure is not applicable to China, because of relatively low 
managerial ownership and of different types of agency problems in China. In contrast 
to western economies, Chinese ownership structures are characterized by the 
dominance of government and institutional owners. There is little research that 
examines the association between corporate governance, measured by share 
ownership at the firm level, and the supply of quality accounting information via 
independent auditing in transitional economies. Given that China is on a course to 
build a credible accounting profession and efficient capital markets, the research 
results have policy implications for regulators in both China and other transitional 
economies. For example, the results provide empirical support, from the auditing 
perspective, for China’s future sale of state shares in the listed companies. The 
reduction of state ownership in listed companies could improve corporate 
governance and encourage management to supply quality accounting information via 
independent auditing.  
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. The next section presents 
the institutional background on China’s stock markets. Section 3 develops the 
research hypothesis. Section 4 describes research methodology. Finally, section 5 







2 Institutional Background 
After nearly two decades of economic reform, the restructuring of 
state-owned enterprise (SOE) has become the key to China’s successful 
transformation from a socialist to a market economy. Systematic ownership reform 
began has relied on a two-pronged initiative of SOE restructuring: while unprofitable 
small and medium sized SOEs are privatized or merged, large SOEs are converted 
into shareholding companies with limited liabilities, and a select few are listed on 
China’s two stock exchanges. Thus, publicly listed companies in China represent a 
relatively high-performing group of business units carved out of a much larger group 
of SOEs.  
The Chinese stock market became a significant vehicle for ownership reform 
of SOEs after the establishment of stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen in the 
early 1990s. Since then, the market has grown rapidly. For example, the total number 
of listed firms increased from 50 in 1992 to 1,243 by April 2003. In addition, the 
total market value of publicly listed shares reached RMB 3,833 billion 
(approximately US$ 479 billion) and has been ranked second in Asia since 2001 
(Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly, February 2003). 
To be eligible for listing, companies must report three consecutive years of 
profits and their return on equity (ROE) must equal or exceed 10% in the two years 
prior to an initial public offering. In order to raise additional capital, listed companies 
should have attained an average ROE of 10% for the prior three years, and at least 
6% each year. According to Chinese regulations, stock shares will be labeled “ST” 
for Special Treatment when a listed company experiences two consecutive annual net 
losses or when the net assets per share are lower than the stock’s par value in the 
current year.1 If the loss continues in the following fiscal year, the shares will be 
                                                 
1 Special Treatment (ST) includes a 5% daily ceiling on price performance, a requirement of audited 
interim financial statements, and certain other requirements. 
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labeled “PT” for Particularly Transfer and share trading will be suspended. 2 
De-listing will follow if the company fails to have the “PT” status lifted in the 
following year. 
Listed Chinese companies issue three major classes of shares: state shares, 
institutional (legal persons) shares, and tradable A-shares.3 State shares are those 
owned by the state, i.e., the central government, local governments, or wholly SOEs. 
State shares are non-tradable, but are transferable to government-related institutions. 
Institutional shares are those held by domestic legal entities including stock 
companies, financial institutions other than banks, and state-private mixed companies. 
Securities firms, trust and investment companies, finance companies, mutual funds, 
and insurance companies constitute the bulk of non-bank financial institutions. 
Institutional shares can only be traded in blocks in a designated market. Tradable 
A-shares are held publicly by individuals and/or domestic institutions, and can be 
traded in the stock market without restriction. 
 Figure 1 depicts the ownership structure for a typical listed Chinese 
company. China Kejian Holding Ltd., a leading electronics manufacturer, was first 
listed on the Shenzhen stock exchange in 1994. The company issued three major 
types of shares mentioned above. State shares are largely owned by Kejian Group 
Ltd., a SOE as well as the parent company of the listed company. Institutional 
investors are comprised of an electronics company and an investment firm. Although 
individual shareholders collectively possessed 36.7% of the firm’s total outstanding 
                                                                                                                                          
 
2 Particularly Transfer (PT) means that shares can only be traded on Friday with the assembly open 
price and a 5% daily ceiling in price movement and no limitation on falling range.  
 
3 There are other types of shares, such as employee shares and foreign shares. The employee shares 
are offered to workers and managers of a listed company, usually at a substantial discount. Foreign 
shares (B-, H-, N-, shares) are available exclusively to foreign investors and some authorized domestic 
securities firms. Many listed companies do not issue employee and foreign shares. If they do, these 
shares typically account for less than 10% of the total outstanding shares.  
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shares, they were all very small investors. 
 
(Insert Figure 1 here.) 
 
Table 1 presents the ownership level of all companies listed on the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen stock exchanges over the period studied. The state, institutional and 
individual investors, respectively, controlled an average of 31.87%, 28.67%, and 
33.42% of the total outstanding shares over the period 1996-2002. All the ownership 
percentages have large standard deviations, suggesting large variations in ownership 
mix across firms. The state and institutional ownerships are largely clustered in the 
range of 0-20%, whereas individual ownership is highly concentrated in the range of 
20-40%. Since the individual ownership is widely dispersed, the state is the dominant 
shareholder in most of the listed companies.  
 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
 
Although the government has attempted to improve firm performance by 
setting up shareholding companies, many listed companies have not performed well. 
For example, the percentage of firms reporting losses has increased from 6% in 1996 
to 13% in 2002. Such poor corporate performance is frequently attributed to severe 
agency problems resulting from high government ownership of listed companies (Xu 
and Wang, 1999; Qi, et al., 2000; Wang, 2003). Gao (1996) suggests that as long as 
the state remains the controlling shareholder, severe agency problems will persist.  
In line with the government’s objective of improving non-performing state 
assets, China has undertaken measures to relax governmental control of listed 
companies by selling state shares to other groups of investors. As a result, the 
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proportion of state shares has declined over the years, while the proportions of 
institutional and tradable A-shares have risen. To examine the effects of this 
restructuring, I conduct a trend analysis of changes in ownership level for 511 firms 
that were listed throughout the period 1996–2002. The results are reported below in 
Table 2.  
 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
Panel A of the Table indicates that the number, as well as the percentage, of 
than companies with 51% or higher levels of state ownership declined from 148 
(29%) in 1996 to 114 (22%) in 2002. The proportion of companies with 51% or 
greater levels of institutional ownership also decreased slightly over the years. In 
contrast to the trend displayed by the state holdings, the percentage of firms with 
A-share owners accounting for more than 50% of total stock has consistently 
increased over the years. Panel B of the Table presents the overall ownership mix by 
year. These data indicate a decrease in the level of state ownership over the period 
studied, along with a slight increase in the level of institutional ownership and a 
larger increase in individual ownership. Prior studies (Xu and Wang, 1999; Qi, et al., 
2000; Wang, 2003) find that while a firm’s profitability is positively correlated with 
the fraction of institutional shares and negatively correlated with the fraction of state 
shares, the influence of individual shareholders on a firm’s profitability is irrelevant. 
These studies attribute the lack of influence by individual shareholders to their 





3     Literature Review and Research Hypothesis 
Agency theory explains how to best organize relationships in which one party 
(the principal) determines the work, while another party (the agent) undertakes 
(Eisenhardt, 1985). In business corporations, the essence of the agency problem is 
the separation of management and ownership, which gives rise to 
management-owner conflicts and thus agency costs. The manager needs the 
shareholders’ funds and the shareholders need the manager’s specialized human 
capital in order to generate returns on their funds. The agency problem here refers to 
the difficulties shareholders (the principal) have in assuring that their funds are not 
expropriated or wasted on unattractive projects by the manager (the agent). To 
mitigate the extent of agency conflicts, shareholders often replace fixed wages of the 
manager with compensation based on the profits of the firm, which are mainly 
reflected in financial reports. However, the determination of financial numbers 
necessarily involves discretion, which provides the manager an opportunity to 
manipulate these numbers. Hence, audited financial reports are widely viewed as a 
means of enhancing the credibility of management-prepared financial reports and 
mitigating agency costs. 
Agency theory suggests that different types of ownership structure have 
different degrees of agency problems, which create different levels of incentives for 
controlling and monitoring the management of the firm, and thus varying levels of 
demand for quality audits (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; DeFond, 1992; Chow, 1982). 
There are two general types of ownership structure: dispersed and concentrated. 
When share ownership is dispersed, as is typical in most UK and US listed 
companies, agency conflicts often arise between managers and shareholders (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). The greater the agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders, the higher the demand for quality audits (DeFond, 1992). Prior studies 
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typically use management ownership to proxy a firm’s ownership structure (e.g., 
Chow, 1982; DeFond, 1992; Gul et al., 1999; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). When the 
manager owns none, or a small proportion, of the firm’s shares, he or she has strong 
incentives to allocate the firm’s resources in ways that are not necessarily consistent 
with the interests of the principal, because the firm manager aspires to maximize his 
or her own rather than the owners’ utility function. The principal’s welfare loss from 
the managers’ divergent behavior is one type of agency cost. To reduce this cost, the 
principal attempts to control the agent’s divergent behavior through monitoring 
activities. Auditing is a form of monitoring activity. Therefore, companies with low 
managerial ownership are more likely to engage a high quality auditor. As the 
manager’s ownership increases, the costs to the manager of consuming perquisites 
also increase, because the manager bears a larger share of the costs of his or her 
actions. Thus, a firm with high level of managerial ownership would have a lesser 
need for higher-quality audits than a firm with a low level of managerial ownership 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
When share ownership is concentrated, as is typical in emerging and 
transitional economies, block shareholders own the majority of firms’ shares and 
possess the voting rights. According to the efficient monitoring hypothesis (Pound, 
1988; Bushee, 1998), increased ownership by large external blockholders serves as a 
monitor of managers’ actions and reduces the likelihood that managers would misuse 
the firm’s resources.4 Stapledon (1996) also suggests that large blockholders can 
improve firm performance by joining the firm’s management. Thus, concentrated 
ownership is viewed as ameliorating the separation of ownership from control that 
creates agency problems. Accordingly, large blockholders have less incentive to 
                                                 
4 The conflict of interest hypothesis suggests that when share ownership is concentrated, the nature of 
agency problems shifts away from manager-shareholder conflicts to conflicts between controlling 
owners and minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Empirical evidence supports the 
efficient monitoring hypothesis.  
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manage a firm’s earnings and would prefer to provide credible accounting 
information through quality audits to improve market returns (Teoh and Wong, 1993; 
Warfield et al., 1995). 
Compared to the typical ownership structure in the West, Chinese ownership 
structures have distinct characteristics. A typical listed Chinese company has a mixed 
ownership structure with two predominant groups of blockholders: the state and 
institutions. Individual shareholders never dominate although collectively they 
account for about one-third of the total shares outstanding. One of the unique 
characteristics of the Chinese stock market is that many listed companies are 
sponsored and controlled by government-related entities. The composition of the 
board and the supervisory committee of state-dominated companies are usually 
characterized by an extremely high state presence.5 In these companies, general 
managers are appointed by the government or their unlisted parent companies. Figure 
2 depicts the chain of principal-agent relationships in the Chinese stock markets.  
 
(Insert Figure 2 here) 
  
The dominance of state ownership creates a number of agency problems. The 
first relates to the ‘absence of principal’ problem. The principal of state shares is the 
state, which represents all Chinese people. The agents are, by order, the central 
government, the provincial government, the municipal government, and state-owned 
enterprise managers and workers. According to the classical agency theory, agents 
                                                 
5 In the Chinese stock market, the largest shareholder normally has a control over the board of 
directors. Xu and Wang (1999) investigate the composition of the boards of 154 listed companies in 
1995 and find that on average, 74.3% of the board members in a state-dominated firm represent the 
largest shareholder, and 54.4% of board members in a legal person dominated firm represent the 
largest shareholder on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. A similar situation exists on the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange. 
 13
are supposed to serve the principal’s interest. However, due to the nonexistence of a 
principal and ambiguity of property rights, no agent in this chain of principal-agent 
relationships has and adequate incentive to pursue profit maximization for the real 
principal (the Chinese people). Consequently, the state has to bear the residual risk of 
all these agents’ divergent behavior in the form of deteriorating firm performance. 
The second agency problem relates to the principal’s ineffective monitoring of the 
agents. The government relies upon its control over the board of directors to preserve 
the value of state properties. However, as many board members who represent the 
state’s interest are appointed and paid by the local government according to their 
administrative rankings rather than firm performance, they may not have sufficient 
incentives to monitor management’s behavior. Moreover, the preferences of the local 
government do not necessarily coincide with those of the state. The third agency 
problem stems from the government’s political influence on corporate decisions. The 
government may divert managerial objectives away from profit maximization and 
towards such objectives as employment and social welfare maximization. The 
intervention of government politicians may also lead to sub-optimal investment by 
managers ex ante.  
In sum, firms with higher levels of state ownership lack sufficient incentives 
to monitor divergent management behavior. From an accounting perspective, the 
high concentration of state ownership provides the government with both the 
incentive and the ability to control the production of a firm’s accounting information 
and its reporting policies. Given the required profit level for raising additional capital 
by listed companies, government owners have strong incentives to pressure 
management to resort to opportunistic choices of accounting methods, but little 
demand for quality audits (DeFond et al., 2000). Moreover, as the government 
usually does not need to rely on publicly released financial information for 
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holdings of institutions and blockholders, the greater the earnings informativeness 
(e.g., Warfield et al., 1995). This suggests that, unlike government owners, 
institutional investors are likely to prefer credible financial information and hire 
quality auditors to improve earnings informativeness and market returns (Teoh and 
Wong, 1993).7  
Under current Chinese regulations, at least 25% of shares outstanding must 
be sold to the general public. However, the vast majority of individual investors are 
relatively small investors and their representation on the boards of directors are 
extremely low even though they possess approximately one third of the total 
outstanding shares (Xu and Wang, 1999). Such small shareholders do not have a big 
enough stake in the firm to absorb the costs of monitoring management (Grossman 
and Hart, 1980). Consequently, no individual shareholder has adequate incentive to 
monitor management closely. Minority shareholders also lack the ability to claim 
damages due to the release of false information by listed companies, as there are no 
adequate corporate governance mechanisms to protect their interests, and the 
litigation costs involved are relatively high for individual shareholders. Furthermore, 
most individual investors in China buy stocks for speculative purposes rather than 
dividend income or long-term growth (Xu and Wang, 1999). This short investment 
horizon makes individual investors unwilling to monitor and control actions taken by 
managers. Therefore, although diffused ownership by individual investors 
                                                 
7 Lee and Gray (2002) argue that in countries where bankers are more significant than shareholders as 
financiers of corporations, as in France, Germany, and Japan, banks would have direct access to 
required information, and thus their demand for publicly available financial information would not be 
very strong. Compared to banks in Japan, Chinese banks play a more passive role on monitoring their 
clients. This is because banks in China are restricted from engaging in share trading. Unlike Germany 
and Japan, all institutional shares are held by non-bank financial institutions in China (Xu and Wang, 
1999). Moreover, although banks maintain close financial ties with companies through debt financing, 
most banks in China are controlled by the government and therefore, they have not been very active in 
monitoring clients’ activities. In a major step towards the resolution of China’s serious banking 
problems, the government established four state-owned non-banking asset management companies in 
1999 to deal with the huge burden of non-performing loans from the state-owned banks (Lin et al., 
2003). 
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theoretically provides the basis for a demand for independent auditing, individual 
investors may not necessarily demand credible information through quality audits 
(DeFond, 1992; Francis and Wilson, 1988; Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). 
Prior studies frequently attribute poor performance of listed companies in 
China to their ownership structure, which gives rise to severe agency problems (e.g., 
Qi et al., 2000; Gao, 1996; Xu and Wang, 1999; Wang, 2003). These studies find that 
the firm’s profitability is positively (negatively) correlated with the fraction of 
institutional (state) shares. Regulators in China have taken measures to deal with the 
inefficiency of state ownership by selling off state shares to other groups of investors, 
such as institutional and individual shareholders. 8  As indicated earlier, such 
measures are bringing about ownership changes in China. A change in ownership 
structure is also paralleled by a change in the composition of the board of directors.9 
It is expected that this change will have an impact on the degree of auditing 
demanded by listed companies in China. Thus I summarize the directional hypothesis 
as follows: 
 
Client firms tend to switch to higher quality audit firms as a result of 
increases (decreases) in the percentage of institutional and individual (state) 
shares.  
                                                 
8 In December 1999, China Jialing (Stock No. 600877) and Qian Tires (Stock No. 000589) became 
the first two companies to pilot the ‘allocation of state-owned shares to holders of A-shares’. In June 
2001, the State Council promulgated the ‘Interim Regulations on Reduction of State-owned Shares to 
Raise Social Security Funds’, prescribing that ‘the reduction of state-owned shares, including state 
shares and state-owned institutional shares, should be interpreted as a behavior to transfer state-owned 
shares of listed companies to public investors of individuals and securities investment funds’, and that 
‘stock issue should be the key channel for the reduction of state-owned shares’. However, within three 
months after the promulgation of the regulations, stock prices in both Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges dropped over 30%, which led to the decision by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission to suspend its implementation. Subsequent reductions of state shares must be approved 
by the Ministry of Finance. 
 
9 For example, the largest state shareholder of Fangxiang Guangdian Ltd. (Stock No. 000757) was 
Neijiang State Assets Management Bureau who held 50.3% of the firm’s total shares outstanding at 
the end of 2001. The board of directors of the firm was composed of five members representing the 
state interest and two members acting for institutional investors. In July 2002, Neijiang State Assets 
Management Bureau sold all its state shares to other three domestic institutional-entity owners. The 
increase in institutional ownership was paralleled by an incremental increase of five members 
representing the interest of different institutional investors and the vanish of members acting for the 
government. 
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4     Research Method 
4.1    Sample data 
To test the hypothesis, I collected ownership data of listed companies that 
changed their auditors during the 1997-2002 period. This information is available 
from the Securities Times and the Shanghai Securities News. Table 3 shows that 632 
firms switched their auditors over the sample period. To reduce noise and avoid the 
need to control some non-agency variables, several categories of switching 
companies are excluded from the sample. First, involuntary auditor switches 
resulting from either license suspension of the previous auditor due to irregularities, 
or from the merger of the incumbent auditor with other auditors, are excluded. 
Second, because that companies received prior audit qualifications tend to switch 
auditors in the subsequent year (Chow and Rice, 1982; Krishnan, 1994; Krishnan and 
Stephens, 1995), companies receiving qualified opinions in the year before an auditor 
switch are excluded. Third, companies that switched auditors more than twice during 
a three-year period are eliminated from the sample, since these switches may relate 
to factors other than ownership structure change (e.g., opinion shopping). Fourth, 
since failing companies have a greater tendency to switch auditors than healthier 
companies (Schwartz and Menon, 1985), companies reporting two or three 
consecutive years of loss (i.e., ST and PT companies) are deleted from the sample.  
Fifth, companies issuing B-shares are excluded from the sample, because a change in 
the domestic auditor could be the result of a change in the international auditor for a 
B-share company. Finally, companies with unusually high growth (i.e., a 
doubling/trebling in size) are excluded from the sample so as not to give undue 
weight to these high-growth companies (DeFond, 1992). Thus, the final sample 
consists of 208 firm-year observations. Table 3 displays the construction and the 
constitution of the final sample. 
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(Insert Table 3 here) 
 
4.2   Regression model 
As discussed earlier, a change in ownership structure may give rise to greater 
demand for quality-differentiated audits. In this study, audit quality is proxied by 
auditor size, which is measured based on client size relative to the total clientele of 
an audit firm (DeAngelo, 1981; DeFond, 1992; Francis and Wilson, 1988), and 
quality-differentiated audits are captured by comparing the size of the new auditor 
with that of the old auditor in the year of auditor change.10 Thus, a switch from a 
smaller, less independent audit firm to a larger, more independent one indicates 
demand for a higher-quality audit. I estimate the following regression model to test 
the relationship between changes in companies’ ownership structures and voluntary 
demand for quality audits by listed Chinese companies.  
 
? Quality = b0 + b1? State + b2? Institutions + b3? Individuals +b4? Size + 
b5? Leverage + b6? accrual + b7Industry + b8? ROE + 
b9Management + b10After99 + e 
  
The dependent variable, ?Quality, is defined as the natural logarithm of the 
ratio of combined assets of listed companies audited by the new auditor to that by the 
old auditor in the year of auditor switch (DeAngelo, 1981; Francis and Wilson, 1988; 
Johnson and Lys, 1990; Defond, 1992). Thus, a ratio above one suggests a greater 
preference for a higher-quality auditor. Changes in ownership structure are measured 
as changes in the percentage of shares held by the state, institutions, and individual 
investors, respectively, between year t and t-1. I predict that the coefficient b1 will be 
                                                 
10 Alternative definitions of audit quality are included in the sensitivity tests. 
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negative and that b2, and b3 will be positive. 
Six agency-related variables are used to control for the effect of changes in 
agency costs on auditor choice.11 Increases in client firm size can be expected to 
increase agency costs due to increased remoteness of principals from the observation 
of agents’ actions.  The larger the size of client firm, the greater the magnitude of 
wealth transfers (agency costs). Since client size is significantly related to auditor 
choice (DeFond, 1992; Healy and Lys, 1986), a ?Size variable, measured as the 
percentage change in total assets between year t and t-1, is included in the model.  
Another type of contractual relationship with the potential for divergence of 
interests is the relationship between debtholders and shareholders. As the amount of 
debt increases, the potential amount of the wealth transfer away from debtholders 
increases, resulting in a greater incentive for such transfers and a greater demand for 
monitoring (Chow, 1982; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Thus I include a ?Leverage variable in the model to capture the potential wealth 
transfers (i.e., agency costs). This variable is measured as the change in the ratio of 
total liabilities to total assets between year t and t-1.  
When ownership is separated from management, conflicts of interests often 
arise between shareholders and managers. Shareholders may contract with 
management under arrangements that attempt to mitigate the extent of conflicts of 
interests between the two groups. One such arrangement is to align managers’ 
interests with those of shareholders. This alignment is often tied to accounting 
numbers. However, the determination of accounting numbers necessarily involves 
                                                 
11 Fifty-six companies that switched auditors in 2002 disclosed their audit fees for both 2001 and 
2002. A comparison of audit fees for these two years indicates that switching companies on average 
paid an extra of RMB 49,100 (approximately US$6,000) per audit subsequent to auditor switch. This 
suggests that audit fee is unlikely to be a factor affecting clients’ auditor switch decisions. Similarly, 
companies with new stock issues may change from a smaller to a larger auditor to increase the 
marketability of new issues (DeFond, 1992). However, there were only six companies raised 
additional capitals through new issues in the sample. Omission of the control variable, new issues, 
will not confound the test results since it is not systematically related to the dependent variable. 
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judgment and discretion, which gives the manager an opportunity to manipulate 
these numbers via short-term accruals (DeFond, 1992; Healy, 1985). One mechanism 
for enhancing the credibility of management-prepared accounting numbers is to hire 
a quality auditor. Therefore, the larger the short-term accruals, the greater the 
vulnerability to earnings management and the greater the demand for quality audits 
as a monitoring mechanism. In this study, I use ?Accrual, which is measured as the 
change in the ratio of short-term accruals to total assets between year t and t-1, to 
measure the effect of vulnerability to manipulation on the demand for monitoring. 
Short-term accruals are constructed as changes in accounts receivable plus inventory 
minus accounts payable and accrued expense over the two years. A positive sign of 
coefficient for ?Accrual represents an increased demand for quality audits. 
Notationally, 
 
As with size, the complexity of an organization increases the agency costs. 
The greater the complexity and diversity of an organization’s activities and 
operations, the greater the difficulty in monitoring the divergent behavior of agents. 
In China, companies in protected industries (e.g., petrochemicals, energy, and raw 
materials) are large monopolies. As these companies are generally more complex and 
geographically dispersed than unprotected companies, they are likely to demand 
quality audits to monitor the manager’s divergent behavior. Accordingly, I include an 
Accruali = (ARt + INVt) – (APt + AccrExpt) 
   
where   
ARt = Accounts receivable of the client at the end of year t in observation i. 
INVt = Inventory of the client at the end of year t in observation i. 
APt = Account payable of the client at the end of year t in observation i. 
AccrExpt = Accrued expenses of the client at the end of year t in observation i. 
   
? Accrual = Accrualt / Total Asstetst – Accrualt-1 / Total Asstetst-1 
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Industry dummy variable in the model (coded one for protected companies and zero 
otherwise) to capture organizational diversity and complexity. 
Return on equity (ROE) is an important quantitative criteria and index for the 
regulatory authorities to assess the companies’ financial conditions for the initial 
public offering and the rights issue. Chinese regulations stipulate that listed 
companies must maintain a minimum ROE for raising additional capital by a rights 
issue. Hence financially distressed companies are more likely than healthier 
companies to make income-increasing accounting changes to meet arbitrary profit 
targets, and to hire more accommodating auditors to mask these changes (DeFond et 
al., 2000). In this study, a ?ROE variable is included in the model to control for the 
impact of firm performance on auditor reporting decisions. This variable is measured 
as the percentage change in ROE between year t and t-1. 
Carpenter and Strawser (1971) and Beattie and Fearnly (1995 and 1998b) 
find that management change (the chairman of the board, the general manager, and 
CEO) often leads to an auditor change. Agency theory considers the auditor-client 
relationship as a mutual contract. A change in management (principal) may alter the 
principal-agent relationship, which in turn could lead to a change in auditor (agent). 
In this study, a dummy variable, Management (coding one for management change 
before the year of auditor switch and zero otherwise), is included in the model to 
capture the effect of management change on auditor switching. Finally, the year 
dummy variable, After99, is included in the model to control for the change in the 






5     Empirical Results 
5.1   Descriptive statistics 
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics on the independent variables included in 
the regression model. Table 4 shows that of the 208 companies that voluntarily 
switched their auditors, 107 companies switched to larger auditors while 101 
switched to smaller ones.  Companies switching to a larger auditor have a greater 
decrease in the percentage of state shares (-5.14%) than companies switching to a 
smaller auditor (-1.01%).12 On the other hand, companies with greater increase in 
non-state shares generally demand higher quality auditors. These univariate results 
are directionally supportive of the association of changes in ownership structure with 
the choice of auditor. Meaning, the greater the decreases (increases) in the proportion 
of state shares (institutional and individual shares), the greater the demand for a 
large-sized auditor.  
 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
 
5.2  Regression results 
Table 5 reports Pearson correlations amongst the independent variables. 
Some interesting observations can be drawn from the table. First, the significantly 
negative correlation between ?State and ?Institutions suggests, perhaps not 
surprisingly, that the percentage increase in institutional shares was directly 
attributed to the decrease in the proportion of state shares. Second, the negative 
correlation coefficient between ?ROE and ?State suggests that greater state 
ownership is associated with poorer firm performance. Finally, it appears that 
companies in protected industries have a lesser extent of decrease in the fraction of 
                                                 
12 A drop of 1% in state shares represents a decline of two million state shares for a listed company. 
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state shares, which may reflect the official position that the state should remain in 
control of key industries. 
  
(Insert Table 5 here) 
 
To avoid multicollinearity problems arising from the high correlation (-0.973) 
between ?State and ?Institutions if these two variables are simultaneously included 
in the model, I run two separate regressions and report the results in Table 6. 
 
(Insert Table 6 here) 
 
Both models are significant at the 5% level, which indicates a strong 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables. All of the significant 
coefficient signs in the models are in the hypothesized directions. As predicted by the 
hypothesis, and indicated by the significantly negative (positive) coefficient for the 
?State  (?Institutions) variable, companies with greater decreases (increases) in the 
proportion of state (institutional) shares are associated with the demand for higher 
quality auditors. The coefficient on ?Individuals is positive but not significant at 
conventional levels, indicating that greater ownership by individual investors does 
not lead to improved preference for audit quality. This suggests that while diffused 
ownership theoretically provides the basis for a demand for independent auditing, 
domestic investors have neither the incentive nor the capability to monitor 
managerial performance, and thus have little regard for auditor differentiation. One 
control variable, Industry, is (weakly) significantly positive. This may support the 
proposition that as companies in protected industries have less need to use earnings 
management to respond to regulatory constraints on profit level (Aharony, et al., 
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2000), they have incentives to use a higher-quality auditor to improve the credibility 
of accounting information. This is also consistent with agency theory which states 
that the greater the complexity and geographical dispersion of an organization’s 
activities and operations, the greater the difficulty in monitoring the divergent 
behavior of agents, thus the greater the demand for reputable auditors to monitor the 
manager’s deviating actions.  
 
5.3   Sensitivity analysis 
I perform the following four sets of sensitivity tests and summarize the results 
in Table 7. First, I test whether the results are robust to alternative definitions of the 
dependent variable. In this regard, I rerun the regressions by using two alternative 
definitions for audit quality: (1) auditor affiliation and (2) auditor independence. In 
the affiliation model, I classify auditors into either top 10 (=1) or non-top 10 (=0) 
groups based on the total client assets audited, since top 10 auditors in China are of 
higher quality than their counterparts (DeFond et al., 2000).13 Thus, a change from a 
non-top 10 to a top 10 auditor suggests a demand for a higher-quality auditor. In the 
independence model, I consider economic dependence of auditors upon their clients 
and compute this dependence as the difference between the ratios of the switching 
client firm’s assets to the total assets of the clients of the old auditor, minus the same 
ratio for the new auditor (DeFond, 1992). Positive difference suggests a preference 
for a quality-differentiated auditor. Table 7 (Tests 1 and 2) reports the results of 
regressing auditor affiliation and independence variables.  
 
(Insert Table 7 here) 
                                                 
13 I did not compare Big 5 vs. non-Big 5 because of insufficient switches to and from the Big 5 
auditors to perform a meaningful statistical analysis. For example, switching from a Big 5 to a 
non-Big 5 auditor and vice versa have only 12 and 10 observations respectively over the sample 
period.   
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Second, I examine whether the results are sensitive to alternative classifications of 
ownership structure. Wang (2003) further classifies state shareholders into 
bureaucratic state shareholders and corporate state shareholders,14 and finds that 
firm performance is negatively correlated with government-controlled firms. 
Following this classification, I break up the ownership of state shares into two 
categories, i.e., shares owned by government agencies and shares held by 
corporations such as SOEs. As corporations are market-oriented economic entities 
and act similarly to institutions, I treat corporate shareholders and institutional 
shareholders as a homogeneous group. The results of replicating Table 6 using this 
alternative classification of share ownership are reported in Test 3 of Table 7. 
Third, instead of using the annual changes in ownership structure over two 
years, I test the effect of the relative dominance by institutions over the state on 
auditor choice in a given year. If greater ownership by institutions reduces agency 
costs through enhanced corporate governance while greater ownership by the state 
creates severe agency problems, then firms with greater institutional shares are more 
likely to engage a quality auditor than firms with greater government shares. To test 
this proposition, I use the difference between the proportions of shares held by 
institutions and the state as a continuous variable to measure the relative dominance 
by institutions over the state. The greater the difference, the greater the dominance of 
institutional investors. All variables are as previously defined, except that I use 
year-end financial statement numbers (instead of annual changes in the main model) 
to measure dependent and independent variables. Empirical results are reported in 
                                                 
14 Bureaucratic state shareholders are government bureaus including central government ministries 
and commissions, national industry groups, local government bureaus, local state assets management 
bureaus, and local state assets management companies. Corporate state shareholders are 
non-government agencies such as SOEs or other types of market-oriented economic entities (Wang, 
2003). 
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Test 4 of Table 7.    
Finally, I focus on the sub-sample of 105 firm-years that do not have 
simultaneous institutions and state ownership. In this sub-sample, 49 observations 
have state shares but no institutional shares, while the remainder has institutional 
shares but no state shares. I use a dummy variable, Institutions, which equals one if a 
firm has institutional shares but no state shares and zero otherwise, to measure the 
absolute dominance by institutional over state owners. All other variables are as 
previously defined. Test 5 of Table 7 displays the test results. 
All of the sensitivity test results point to a single conclusion regarding the 
experimental variables. Tests 1 to 3 provide a consistent result: changes in share 
ownership are associated with changes in audit quality. More specifically, companies 
with greater decreases in the proportion of state shares are more likely to switch to a 
higher-quality auditor than companies with smaller decreases in the proportion of 
state shares, whereas companies have greater increases in the proportion of 
institutional shares have a greater tendency to switch to a higher-quality auditor than 
companies with smaller increases in the proportion of institutional shares. The results 
of Tests 4 and 5 measuring the relative ownership dominance by institutional over 
state owners are also supportive of the argument that companies dominated by 
institutional investors would voluntarily demand higher-quality auditors than 
companies dominated by the state.15 One control variable, After99, is significantly 
positive at the 10% level in Tests 1, 4 and 5, which suggests that clients are more 
likely to be associated with a larger audit firm subsequent to the firm mergers started 
in early 2000. Client Size is also significantly positive at the 1% level in Tests 4 and 
                                                 
15 The weaker results for the explanatory variables in the sensitivity Test 4 may lie on the sample. The 
results of test 4 are based on companies that switched auditors. To examine the proposition that 
greater ownership by institutional investors is associated with higher quality auditors, I extend the 
sample to include non-switching companies and use the 2002 data to rerun Test 4. As expected, the 
explanatory variables of the interest have then become strongly significant at the 1% level. 
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5, indicating that larger firms are more likely to engage an auditor who is of higher 
quality than smaller firms. 
In conclusion, the main results, together with the results of sensitivity tests, 
suggest that greater institutional ownership can improve the supply of credible 























6    Conclusions  
  To improve firm performance and corporate governance, China has in recent 
years relaxed governmental control over corporate affairs through ownership reform. 
The reform has brought about changes in firm ownership structure. This paper 
examines whether changes in corporate ownership affect the demand for differential 
quality audits. Agency theory suggests that different type of ownership structures 
have different degree of agency problems, which lead to different incentives for 
shareholders to control and monitor firm management. When shares are concentrated 
and controlled by institutional shareholders, as opposite to government-entity owners, 
institutional investors have strong incentives to closely monitor divergent behavior of 
corporate management through independent auditing. Using an agency theory 
framework, I hypothesize that the fall of states shares and the corresponding rise of 
institutional and individual shares will lead to a demand for higher-quality audits in 
China’s stock market.  
The empirical test results, based on 208 voluntary auditor switches pooled 
over the period 1996-2002, are supportive of the hypothesized association between 
changes in ownership structure and changes in auditor quality. Specifically, the 
decreases in the percentage of state shares and the increases in the fraction of 
institutional shares result in a general increase for higher-quality audits by listed 
companies in China. The results are robust after controlling for client size, leverage, 
industry, accruals, management change, return on equity, time effect, and for other 
alternative definitions of audit quality and ownership structure. However, the results 
do not support the proposition that diffusion of ownership by domestic individual 
investors lead to a preference for credible accounting information and thus for 
quality audits. This suggests that small individual shareholders have neither the 
incentive nor the capability to monitor corporate management.  
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 These findings have policy implications for Chinese regulators. First, to 
encourage the supply of quality accounting information, a certain degree of 
ownership concentration by large institutional owners is needed in China’s stock 
markets. The presence of large external blockholders is also important to a sound 
corporate governance that provides protection of the interest of minority shareholders. 
Second, China should diversify the government ownership and introduce other forms 
of large external shareholders. The government’s recent initiative in selling off state 
shares is an important step in improving the efficiency of China’s stock markets, the 
effectiveness of corporate governance, and the credibility of accounting information.  
The results are subject to some limitations. The hypothesis that larger audit 
firms provide higher quality audits is based on the argument put forward by 
DeAngelo (1981) that as larger audit firms have more clients, they have more 
aggregate client-specific quasi-rents at stake if a low-quality audit becomes known. 
Empirical studies using pricing in IPOs, discretionary accruals, earnings response 
coefficients, frequency of audit qualifications and auditor litigation as measures of 
audit quality are generally supportive of DeAngelo’s argument. Similar to most 
studies, I have not distinguished the effects of auditor competence from auditor 
independence. Thus, it is not clear whether the hypothesized relation between auditor 
size and audit quality still holds after controlling for the difference in auditor 
competence. 
Second, the sample represents only a small subset of China’s enterprises: a 
better-performing group of enterprises that were selected to be listed on the two stock 
exchanges. Therefore, caution is needed when interpreting the results. Further study 
can investigate whether the hypothesized relationship between corporate ownership 
and auditor differentiation still holds for unlisted companies in China. Third, the 
study respectively used auditor size, affiliation, and independence to capture auditor 
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quality. To provide more information on quality and reduce possible noise in the 
dependent variable, further research may use a combined measure of audit quality to 
study the incremental effect of a combined measure over a single measure. Finally, 
apart from client size, there are other alternative surrogates of audit quality, such as 
auditor opinions, discretionary accruals, auditor litigation, and earnings response 
coefficients. Further study could employ each of these variables as a representation 
of audit quality.   
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Figure 2:  Agency Setting in the Chinese Stock Market 
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Table 1:  Share Ownership Level of Listed Chinese Companies (1996 – 2002) 
 Mean Std. Dev. 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-80% 80-100% 
State 31.87 26.59 38.37 18.53 23.33 19.02 0.75 
Institutional 28.67 26.73 48.48 16.62 16.20 17.69 1.02 
Individual 33.42 13.74 13.23 59.98 23.29  2.95 0.56 














Table 2:  Changes in Ownership Level for 511 Companies Listed throughout the Period 1996-2002 
  Mean  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
  # %  # %  # %  # %  # %  # %  # %  # % 
Panel A: Ownership mix by percentile                      
State shares: 0-50%  385 (75.34)  363 (71.04)  372 (72.80)  386 (75.54)  392 (76.71)  392 (76.71)  394 (77.10)  397 (77.69) 
 51-100%  126 (24.66)  148 (28.96)  139 (27.20)  125 (24.46)  119 (23.28)  119 (23.29)  117 (22.90)  114 (22.31) 
   511 (100)  511 (100)  511 (100)  511 (100)  511 (100)  511 (100)  511 (100)  511 (100) 
                         
Institutional shares: 0-50%  366 (71.62)  356 (69.67)  361 (70.65)  359 (70.25)  357 (69.86)  369 (72.21)  381 (74.56)  378 (73.97) 
 51-100%  145 (28.38)  155 (30.33)  150 (29.35)  152 (29.75)  154 (30.14)  142 (27.79)  130 (25.44)  133 (26.03) 
   511 (100)  511 (100)  511 (100)  511 (100)  511 (100)  511 (100)  511 (100)  511 (100) 
                         
Individual shares: 0-50%  439 (85.91)  468 (91.59)  466 (91.19)  462 (90.41)  450 (88.06)  423 (82.78)  406 (79.45)  398 (77.89) 
 51-100%  72 (14.09)  43 (8.41)  45 (8.81)  49 (9.59)  61 (11.94)  88 (17.22)  105 (20.55)  113 (22.11) 
   511 (100)  511 (100)  511 (100)  511 (100)  511 (100)  511 (100)  511 (100)  511 (100) 
                         
Other shares: 0-50%  511 (100)  510 (99.80)  510 (99.80)  510 (99.80)  510 (99.80)  511 (100)  511 (100)  511 (100) 
 51-100%  0 (0)   1 (0.20)   1 (0.20)  1 (0.20)  1 (0.20)  0 (0)  0 (0)  0 (0) 
   511 (100)  511 (100)  511 (100)  511 (100)  511 (100)  511 (100)  511 (100)  511 (100) 
 
Panel B: Overall ownership mix Mean  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
State shares:   28.48  31.33  29.75  28.19  27.43  27.91  27.67  27.08 
Institutional shares:   31.06  30.32  30.76  31.723  31.57  30.75  31.36  31.43 
Individual shares:   33.58  29.95  30.31  31.06  33.63  36.32  36.66  37.13 




Table 3:  Sample Selection Criteria 
 1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  Total  
Number of auditor switches 29  87  50  93  256  117  632  
Less:  Missing data 8  0  0  4  3  0  15  
Involuntary auditor switches 0  50  0  0  173  26  249  
Firms with qualified opinions 4  3  15  15  14  18  69  
      ST/PT firms 0  6  10  14  20  16  66  
      Firms switched auditors more than twice 0  0  0  1  1  0  2  
Firms issuing B-shares and banks 2  3  1  2  5  2  15  
High-growth firms 2  0  0  3  2  1  8  
























 Switch to larger auditors (N=107)  Switch to smaller auditors (N=101)  t-statistic 
 Mean  Std. deviation  Mean  Std. deviation  Mean difference Significance 
? State shares -5.14   16.64   -1.01   12.61   -4.13   0.046** 
? Institutional shares  4.47   16.82   0.19   12.80   4.28   0.041** 
? Individual shares  2.33    5.08   1.44   3.98   0.89   0.164 
? Client assets (log) 12.22   22.92   14.43   21.49   -2.21   0.486 
? Leverage 2.37   11.13   3.13   8.49   -0.76   0.581 
? Short-term accruals -0.03    0.28   0.01   0.13   -0.04   0.240 
Industry (dummy) 0.22    0.42   0.08   0.27   0.14   0.004*** 
? ROE 0.14    6.92   0.13   7.37   0.02   0.985 
Management change (dummy) 0.50    0.50   0.45   0.50   0.05   0.396 
After99 (dummy) 0.71   0.46   0.69   0.46   0.02   0.787 
           
*, **, ***: Significant at 10%, 5%, 1%           
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Table 5:  Pearson Correlation Matrix amongst Independent Variables 
 ? State ? Institutions ? Individuals ? Size ? Leverage ? Accrual Industry ? ROE Management 
? State          
          
? Institutions   -0.973***         
 (0.000)         
          ? Individuals -0.106 -0.037        
 (0.126) (0.591)        
          ? Size 0.025 -0.053  0.122*       
 (0.730) (0.463) (0.087)       
          ? Leverage -0.068 0.103 -0.110  0.304***      
 (0.333) (0.139) (0.116) (0.000)      
          ? Accrual -0.032 0.022 -0.066 -0.149** 0.069     
 (0.643) (0.750) (0.344) (0.036) (0.320)     
          Industry  -0.147**  0.155** -0.046 -0.002 -0.026 -0.011    
 (0.034) (0.026) (0.513) (0.974) (0.711) (0.872)    
          ? ROE  -0.143**  0.161** -0.025 0.010 0.111 0.029 -0.027   
 (0.043) (0.023) (0.725) (0.889) (0.116) (0.679) (0.699)   
          Management 0.008 -0.018 0.039 -0.032 -0.013 0.004 -0.006 -0.113  
 (0.903) (0.791) (0.578) (0.653) (0.852) (0.959) (0.930) (0.110)  
          After99 0.064 -0.056 0.056 0.033 0.079 -0.114 0.103 -0.161** 0.074 
 (0.360) (0.425) (0.421) (0.642) (0.261) (0.102) (0.138) (0.022) 0.289 
 *, **, ***: Significant at 10%, 5%, 1% 
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Table 6:  Multivariate Results for the Association between Changes in Ownership Level and Auditor Differentiation (N=208) 
  Model No. 1   Model No. 2 
 Predicted Sign Coefficient t-statistic P-value   Coefficient t-statistic P-value 
Intercept  -0.084 -0.932 0.353   -0.084 -0.930 0.354 
? State - -0.181 -2.464  0.015**      
? Institutions +      0.183 2.513  0.013** 
? Individuals + 0.072 0.973 0.332   0.095 1.290 0.199 
? Size + -0.027 -0.328 0.743   -0.020 -0.248 0.805 
? Leverage + 0.060 0.742 0.459   0.051 0.622 0.534 
? Accrual + 0.035 0.476 0.634   0.034 0.466 0.642 
Industry + 0.145 1.975  0.050**   0.145 1.980  0.049** 
? ROE + 0.010 0.137 0.891   0.005 0.073 0.942 
Management ? -0.064 -0.880 0.380   -0.065 -0.889 0.375 
After99 + 0.096 1.269 0.206   0.093 1.243 0.215 
Adjusted R2   0.042     0.043  
Model F-stat.   1.927     1.948  
P-value    0.050**      0.048**  
Model specification: 
? Quality = b0+b1? State+b2? Institutions+b3? Individuals +b4? Size + b5? Leverage+b6? Accrual +b7Industry+b8? ROE+ b9Management + b10After99 + e 
Variable definitions: 
? Quality = Natural logarithm of the ratio of combined assets of companies audited by the new auditor to that by the old auditor in the year of auditor change. 
? State = Percentage change in state shares between year t and t-1. 
? Institutions = Percentage change in institutional shares between year t and t-1. 
? Individuals = Percentage change in individual shares between year t and t-1. 
? Size = Percentage change in client firm assets between year t and t-1. 
? Leverage = Change in the ratio of total liabilities to total assets between year t and t-1. 
? Accrual = Change in the ratio of short-term accruals to total assets between year t and t-1. 
Industry = 1 if the client firm operates in the ‘protected’ industries and 0 otherwise. 
? ROE = Percentage change in return on equity between year t and t-1. 
Management = 1 if client firm changes its management and 0 otherwise. 
After99 = 1 if the client firm switched auditor after year 1999, and 0 otherwise. 




Table 7:  Summary of Sensitivity Test Results 
 Variables Intercept ? State ? Institutions ? Individual ? Size ? Leverage ? Accrual Industry ? ROE Management After99 Model p-value 
Predicted sign  (-) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (?) (+)  
Test 1:    Logistic regression for auditor affiliation model (Dependent variable is change from a non-top10 to a top 10 (1) and otherwise (0))  
Model 1 Coefficient -3.029 -0.031  0.020 0.001 0.029 -0.571 0.004 0.013 -0.664 1.245  
 p-value 0.000***  0.014**  0.666 0.976 0.359 0.711 0.995 0.703 0.181 0.068* 0.065* 
              
Mode 2 Coefficient -3.019  0.030 0.031 0.001 0.026 -0.584 0.006 0.012 -0.673 1.232  
 p-value 0.000***   0.014** 0.510 0.931 0.404 0.707 0.993 0.741 0.176 0.070* 0.066* 
              Test 2:    OLS regression for auditor independence model (Dependent variable is the difference between the ratios of the switching client’s assets to the total clientele assets of the old 
auditor, minus the same ratio for the new auditor) 
Model 1 Coefficient -0.022 -0.264  -0.016 -0.143 -0.114 -0.054 -0.030 0.006 -0.067 0.084  
 p-value 0.354 0.000***  0.823   0.129 0.132 0.549 0.672 0.933 0.351 0.245 0.015** 
              
Model 2 Coefficient -0.021  0.267 0.021 -0.135 -0.122 -0.044 -0.030 0.001 -0.067 0.081  
 p-value 0.366    0.000*** 0.769   0.150 0.109 0.623 0.666 0.984 0.347 0.261 0.013** 
              
Test 3:    OLS regression for auditor size model (Dependent variable is natural log of the ratio of dollar assets audited by the new auditor to that by the old auditor). 
Model 1 Coefficient -0.062 -0.240  0.091 -0.030 0.101 0.052 0.169 0.018 -0.049 0.059  
 p-value 0.484 0.001***  0.213 0.707 0.217 0.467  0.019** 0.807 0.502 0.427 0.010*** 
              
Model 2 Coefficient -0.063  0.238 0.127 -0.020 0.085 0.051 0.169 0.012 -0.052 0.058  
 p-value 0.476    0.001*** 0.085 0.807 0.294 0.483  0.018** 0.874 0.477 0.432  0.011** 
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